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I. INTRODUCTION
In this Article, I offer a suggested taxonomy in the form of a filter
(see Figure A) to aid in the productive discussion of animal protection
legislation. The filter is designed to migrate discussions towards
objective analysis and away from frenetic labels of animal rights
zealotry. The filter is demonstrated in this Article using California’s foie
gras law as an exemplar.
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California’s prohibition on the sale of foie gras produced through
force-feeding methods has been characterized as a “ban” on the
product.1 This law was crafted to address an inhumane force-feeding
practices,2 and continues to allow for the sale of foie gras that is not
produced through force-feeding methods.3
*Associate Professor of Business Law, California Polytechnic State University, Orfalea
College of Business, San Luis Obispo, California; Active Member of CA Bar (170669). The
author extends his thanks to, and acknowledges his appreciation of, Jessica Stookey for
her valuable input, comments, and assistance, as well as the Editorial Board of Seton Hall
Legislative Journal.
1CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25980-25984 (2020); see generally California Foie Gras
Ban Goes Into Effect After Supreme Court Rejects Challenge, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Jan. 7,
2019, 5:05 PM), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-foie-gras-prohibition-courtruling-20190107-story.html; Jonathan Kauffman, California Foie Gras Ban Upheld
Though Chefs Vow To Fight On, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (Jan. 7, 2019, updated Jan. 8,
2019 7:03 AM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/food/article/California-s-foie-gras-banupheld-though-chefs-13514763.php; Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Supreme Court Rejects
Challenge To California Foie Gras Ban, REUTERS (Jan. 7, 2019 11:11 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-foiegras/u-s-supreme-court-rejectschallenge-to-california-foie-gras-ban-idUSKCN1P11LD.
2 Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Québec v. Becerra, 870 F.3d 1140 (9th
Cir. 2017), cert. denied 139 S.Ct. 862 (2019) (“California’s law was designed to rectify
what the state considered an inhumane feeding practice. See 2004 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch.
904 (S.B. 1520) (Legislative Counsel’s Digest) (seeking to establish provisions for forcefeeding birds similar to those already in place for ‘keeping horses or other equine
animals’). According to the legislative analysis of the law, force-feeding commonly
requires a worker to hold the bird between her knees, grasp the bird’s head, insert a 10to 12-inch metal or plastic tube into the bird’s esophagus, and deliver large amounts of
concentrated meal and compressed air into the bird. See, e.g., Cal. Assemb. Comm. on
Bus. & Professions, Analysis of S.B. 1520, 2003–2004 Reg. Sess., at 4–5 (June 20, 2004);
Cal. Sen. Comm. on Bus. & Professions, Analysis of S.B. 1520, 2003–2004 Reg. Sess., at 5–
6 (May 6, 2004). The bird is force-fed up to three times a day for several weeks and its
liver grows to ten times the size of a normal liver. Cal. Assemb. Comm. on Bus. &
Professions, Analysis of S.B. 1520, 2003–2004 Reg. Sess., at 5 (June 20, 2004). This
process is apparently ‘so hard on the birds that they would die from the pathological
damage it inflicts if they weren’t slaughtered first.’ Cal. Assemb. Comm. on Bus. &
Professions, Analysis of S.B. 1520, 2003–2004 Reg. Sess., at 2 (Aug. 17, 2004); Cal. Sen.
Comm. on Bus. & Professions, Analysis of S.B. 1520, 2003–2004 Reg. Sess., at 3 (Aug. 25,
2004). In enacting the force-feeding ban, California also considered a study conducted
by the European Union’s Scientific Committee on Animal Health and an Israeli Supreme
Court decision. The European Union study concluded that force-feeding is detrimental
to the welfare of birds, and the Israeli Supreme Court similarly concluded that forcefeeding causes birds pain and suffering. Cal. Assemb. Comm. on Bus. & Professions,
Analysis of S.B. 1520, 2003–2004 Reg. Sess., at 6–7 (June 20, 2004); Cal. Sen. Comm. on
Bus. & Professions, Analysis of S.B. 1520, 2003–2004 Reg. Sess., at 7–8 (May 6, 2004). In
light of these and other factors, California decided to enact the ban, joining a growing list
of countries around the world.”) Id. at 1143-1144.
3 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25980-25981 (2020). See generally Lauren Frayer,
This Spanish Farm Makes Foie Gras Without Force Feeding, (August 1, 2016, 4:27 p.m.),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/08/01/487088946/this-spanish-farmmakes-foie-gras-without-force-feeding; see also Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d Oies
du Quebec v. Harris, No. 2:12-CV-05735-SVW-RZ, 2020 WL 595440, at 3 (C.D. Cal. Jan.
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Force-feeding is the predominant method of production,4 and
descriptions about the process are unsettling,5 although proponents
14, 2020) (“Neither this Court nor the Ninth Circuit has ever concluded that § 25982
constitutes a total ban on foie gras—that is a legal conclusion not ascertainable from a
conclusory allegation.”).
4 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25982 (2020) (“A product may not be sold in
California if it is the result of force-feeding a bird for the purpose of enlarging the bird’s
liver beyond normal size.”) See also, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25980(b) (2020)
(“Force-feeding a bird means a process that causes the bird to consume more food than
a typical bird of the same species would consume voluntarily. Force-feeding methods
include, but are not limited to, delivering feed through a tube or other device inserted
into the bird’s esophagus.”) See generally Mariann Sullivan and David J. Wolfson, What’s
Good for the Goose . . . The Israeli Supreme Court, Foie Gras, and the Future of Farmed
Animals in the United States, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 139, 144 (Winter 2007) (“Foie gras,
the fatty liver of a goose or duck, can only be produced if birds are force-fed, since, on
their own, birds would not eat enough to cause their livers to reach the desired state of
fattiness.”); Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Québec v. Becerra, 870 F.3d
1140, 1143 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied 139 S.Ct. 862 (2019) (“In the final stage of the
feeding process, which lasts up to thirteen days, the birds are force-fed in a process
called gavage, during which feeders use ‘a tube to deliver the feed to the crop sac at the
base of the duck’s esophagus.”); and Michaela Anne DeSoucey, Gullet Politics;
Contentious Foie Gras Politics and the Organization of Public Morality in the United States
and France 28 (December 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern
University) (on file with ProQuest LLC, UMI Number: 3419034) (“The process of feeding
ducks and geese to produce foie gras, called gavage in French, is what is at the heart of
international contention surrounding the morality of foie gras production.”).
5 D.A. Jeremy Telman, Is The Quest For Corporate Responsibility A Wild Goose Chase?
The Story Of Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 44 AKRON L. REV. 479, 502 (2011) (“[T]he
process of force-feeding usually begins when the birds are four-months old. At farms at
which the process has been mechanized, the birds are placed in a metal brace and the
neck is stretched so that a funnel may be inserted 10-12 inches down the bird’s throat.
Four hundred grams of corn mash are then pumped into the birds’ stomachs, while an
elastic band around its neck prevents regurgitation. Where the process is done by hand,
the feeder uses a funnel and a stick to force the mash down the bird’s throat. The birds
are force-fed for between 15 and 28 days, and shortly thereafter they are slaughtered.
During the brief period of force-feeding, the geese double their weight, but their livers
swell until they account for up to 10% of the bird’s total weight. An ordinary goose liver
weighs about 120 grams; the liver of a force-fed bird weighs between 800 and 1000
grams. Up to 10% of the birds die before they can be slaughtered as a result of the forced
feeding.”); see also Sullivan and Wolfson, supra note 4, at 144 (“The resulting swelling of
the liver is commonly considered a pathological state called ‘hepatic lipidosis’ or ‘fatty
liver disease’,’ and, presumably, the breakdown in liver function causes the birds to feel
extremely ill. The dramatic increase in liver size also makes walking and breathing
difficult. Mortality levels increase, and the birds would die if they were not taken for
slaughter. The pre-slaughter mortality rate for foie gras production is up to twenty
times the average rate on other bird farms.”; Yossi Wolfson, Animal Protection Under
Israeli Law, in ANIMAL LAW AND WELFARE – INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 161 (Deborah Cao &
Steven White eds., 2016) (“Fatty liver, the production of which is the raison d’etre of the
industry, is by definition a liver in pathological state of hypertrophy and steatosis—
enlarged and fat. This pathological condition can only be reached by coercive process
of forcibly introducing large quantities of food, high in carbohydrates, to the birds’
intestines. This is generally done by shoving a pipe into the bird’s esophagus, and
compressing the food through it using mechanical, hydraulic or pneumatic pressure.
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argue that the lack of a gag reflex in ducks and geese helps justify the
practice.6
Legislators built a grace period of over seven years into this law to
allow for alteration of the prohibited force-feeding practices.7
Prolonged litigation to defeat the law has not been fruitful,8 but a July
2020 court determination clarified that the California foie gras law
allows for import and consumption of restricted foie gras if the
underlying sale occurs outside of the state.9 New York City also recently

The enlarged liver presses other organs, which causes difficulties in breathing and in
walking—another problem which is inherent and unavoidable. While there may be
some variations of technique, animal suffering cannot be substantially reduced while
still producing the desired product.”).
6 See Joshua D. Hodes, 2004 Legislative Review, 11 ANIMAL L. 325, 362 (2005) (“A
staff veterinarian for the California Department of Food and Agriculture has already said
that ducks have no gag reflex . . . .”); Kristin Cook, Comment: The Inhumanity Of Foie Gras
Production ‐ Perhaps California And Chicago Have The Right Idea, 2 J. Animal L. & Ethics
263, 265 (May, 2007) (“Producers also claim that the process is not injurious to the birds
because the feeding only takes a short time and because the birds lack a gag reflex.”).
7 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25984(c) (2020). See also, Ass’n des Éleveurs de
Canards et d’Oies du Québec v. Becerra, 870 F.3d 1140, 1144 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied
139 S.Ct. 862 (2019) (“California’s legislature intended to ban not foie gras itself, but
rather the practice of producing foie gras by force-feeding. The law’s author, Senator
John Burton, made clear when he introduced the bill that it ‘has nothing to do . . . with
banning foie gras’ and that it prohibits only the ‘inhumane force-feeding [of] ducks and
geese.’ Then-Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger echoed this sentiment in his signing
statement: ‘This bill’s intent is to ban the current foie gras production practice of forcing
a tube down a bird’s throat to greatly increase the consumption of grain by the bird. It
does not ban the food product, foie gras.’ Signing Message of Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger, Sen. Bill 1520, 2003–2004 Reg. Sess. (Sept. 29, 2004). The legislature
provided more than seven and a half years between the passage of the law and its
effective date to allow producers to transition to producing foie gras without forcefeeding.”)
8 See Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec v. Becerra, 139 S. Ct. 862
(2019) (denying review of the Ninth Circuit’s determination that California’s ban on
force-feeding of birds for the production of foie gras was not pre-empted by federal law).
See also, Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Québec v. Harris, 574 U.S. 932
(2014); Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d Oies du Quebec v. Harris, No. 2:12-CV-05735SVW-RZ, 2020 WL 595440, at 3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2020).
9 Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d Oies du Quebec v. Harris, No. 2:12-cv-05735SVW-RZ, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131895 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2020) (“Accordingly, the Court
concludes the most reasonable interpretation of § 25982, in accordance with the intent
of California and the plain language of the statute, does not encompass the factual
scenario presented by Plaintiffs. The Court holds that a sale of foie gras does not violate
§ 25982 when:
- The Seller is located outside of California.
- The foie gras being purchased is not present within California at the time of sale.
- The transaction is processed outside of California (via phone, fax, email, website, or
otherwise).
- Payment is received and processed outside of California, and
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restricted sales of foie gras produced through force-feeding practices,
effective in 2022.10
Supporters of the California foie gras law have been met with
accusations of animal rights extremism, along with labels of zealotry
and other sullying terminology.11 “Animal rights activists are often
called nut jobs, wackos, and extremists—and that is by our friends and
family members.”12 Such labels and rhetoric are counterproductive to
the discussion. “The willingness of humans to exploit animals for their
benefit has been labeled homocentric, narcissistic, and parasitic, while
animal advocates’ preoccupation with animal rights has been called
fanatical and misanthropic.”13
All of the extensive legal battles surrounding this topic raise the
specter of a larger issue: how should legislators, regulators, courts, and
the public evaluate laws related to the treatment of animals?14
In order to help address this dichotomy, this Article offers a
taxonomy for analyzing and discussing animal protection legislation in
the form of a cone-shaped “filter” using associated theories within the

- The foie gas is given to the purchaser or a third-party delivery service outside of
California, and ‘[t]he shipping company [or purchaser] thereafter transports the product
to the recipient designated by the purchaser,’ even if the recipient is in California. Dkt.
218 at 5.
This judgement is limited to the circumstances described above, and does not
encompass situations wherein the Seller is present in California during the sale, or the
foie gras is already present in California when the sale is made.”) Id. at 12.
10 N.Y.C., ADMIN. CODE, §§17-1901 THROUGH 17-1903; see also, Jeffery C. Mays and
Amelia Nierenberg, Foie Gras Served In 1,000 Restaurants in New York City Is Banned,
N.Y.TIMES, (October 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/30/nyregion/foiegras-ban-nyc.html; Leah Asmelash, New York City Will Ban Restaurants and Grocery
Stores from Selling Foie Gras, CNN (Oct. 31, 2019, 11:51 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/30/us/foie-gras-new-york-ban-trnd/index.html; New
York City lawmakers pass bill banning foie gras, AP (Oct. 30, 2019),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/30/new-york-city-expected-to-pass-bill-banningfoie-gras.html).
11 See generally Kauffman, supra note 1 (referred to as “vegan extremists” by chef’s
coalition opposing California foie gras law); Steve Cuozzo, Opinion: Why Ban Foie Gras
But Not Other Meats Rooted In Animal Cruelty, NY POST (FEB. 4, 2019),
https://nypost.com/2019/02/04/why‐ban‐foie‐gras‐but‐not‐other‐meats‐rooted‐in‐
animal‐cruelty/ (“. . . count on animal-rights zealots . . .”); Elena Ferretti, Chefs Say Foie
Gras Ban Could Spread Beyond California, FOX NEWS (MAY 18, 2012, updated Nov. 21,
2016),
https://www.foxnews.com/food‐drink/chefs‐say‐foie‐gras‐ban‐could‐spread‐
beyond‐california (“. . . animal rights activists . . .”).
12 Diane M. Sullivan, Holly Vietzke & Michael L. Coyne, A Modest Proposal For
Advancing Animal Rights, 71 ALBANY L. REV. 1129 (2008).
13 Stephen A. Plass, Exploring Animal Rights As An Imperative For Human Welfare,
112 W.VA.L.REV. 403, 405 (Winter, 2010).
14 For purposes of brevity in this article, references to animals means non-human
animals.
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filter. This Article uses the California foie gras law as an exemplar. The
proposed filter is intended to facilitate meaningful inquiry and dialogue
in the debate surrounding rights and treatment of animals, as “the State
has an interest in preventing animal cruelty . . . . “15 The filter is designed
to help analyze purported animal protection legislation and expose both
the flaws and strengths in such laws.
II. WHY SHOULD WE CARE ABOUT THE TREATMENT OF ANIMALS?
A. Our Contradictory Relationship With Animal Welfare
Our relations with animals “are based on contradiction. We coddle
them, eat them, leave our estates to them, experiment on them, buy
them designer collars and clothes, wear them, risk our lives for them,
and abandon and kill them.”16
In the context of the California foie gras law, one might question the
rationale for legislation regarding treatment of an animal whose
ultimate fate is to be eaten. The short answer is that “determining what
it means to treat animals humanely involves our [human] values, not
just the qualities of any given animal.”17 Traversing the bridge to
concerns about food animal treatment opens an important dialogue on
the legality and ethics of raising and eating food animals, as well as the
treatment of all animals.18 Moreover, if the certainty of future death of
animals destined for slaughter eradicates the need for concern over
such animals, then every living thing (including humans) would be
undeserving of any scintilla of concern, as future death is the only
certainty.19
15 Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 952
(9th Cir. 2013). See also, United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469 (2010) (“[T]he
prohibition of animal cruelty itself has a long history in American law, starting with the
early settlement of the Colonies.”).
16 Ani B. Satz, Animals as Vulnerable Subjects: Beyond Interest‐Convergence,
Hierarchy and Property, 16 ANIMAL L. 65, 67 (2009).
17 Craig A. Wenner, Note: Judicial Review and the Human Treatment of Animals, 86
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1630, 1631 (2011).
18 See generally Joan MacLeod Heminway & Patricia Graves Lenaghan, Safe Haven
Conundrum: The Use of Special Bailments to Keep Pets Out of Violent Households, 12 TENN.
J. L. & POL’Y 79, 113 (2017) (“[A]nimals ‘are either persons, beings to whom the principle
of equal consideration applies and who possess morally significant interests in not
suffering or things, beings to whom the principle of equal consideration does not apply
and whose interests may be ignored if it benefits us.’”); see also Peter Singer, All Animals
Are Equal, 1 PHILOSOPHIC EXCHANGE 103 (1974); see also Sherry Colb, Subject of a Death,
105 CORNELL L. REV. 205, 220 (2020).
19 See generally Andrew Benton, Personal Autonomy and Physician Assisted Suicide:
The Appropriate Response to a Modern Ethical Dilemma, 20 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 769, 778
(1994) (“[D]eath is certain.” (quoting American Medical Association, Report B of the
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A review of the historical and philosophical roots of the human
contradictory relationship with animals sheds some light on how we
have ended up in the current state of affairs.
The ontology of the human impetus to disregard animal
interests is unclear. It may be attributed to early religious
thought embracing human dominion over animals. Some early
philosophers also disregarded animals. The Stoics, possibly
shaping the development of religious views about animals,
believed humans did not possess moral obligations towards
animals lacking the ability to engage in ethical decisionmaking or virtuous activity.20
Viewing only humans as possessing a soul, morality, or
intelligence21 is an abrogation of the facts,22 as well as a dereliction of
duties, with regard to animal welfare.23
“And God said, let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and
let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the
air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association (1991)));
Michael S. Greve, Our Federalism is Not Europe’s, It’s Becoming Argentina’s, 7 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 42 (2012) (“As Thomas Hobbes taught, the fear of death never
prompts individual action: death is certain, and fear of it is a constant.”); Continental
Assur. Co., Inc. v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 474, 482 (Ct. Cl. 1934) (“While death is certain,
the uncertain and contingent event is when the individual will die.”).
20 Satz, supra note 16, at n. 3.
21 Laura G. Kniaz, Animal Liberation and the Law: Animals Board the Underground
Railroad, 43 BUFFALO L. REV. 765, 770-771 (Winter, 1995) (“Despite the opposition’s
efforts, there is an increasing body of literature blurring the distinctions between
humans and other animals, whether one looks to genetic differences, language
capabilities, morality, intelligence, the ability to make and use tools, or possession of a
soul. Thus, numerous studies persuasively demonstrate that at least some animals
possess each of these allegedly unique human qualities.”).
22 Id.; see also, Joyce Tischler, Symposium: International Wildlife Trafficking: Law and
Policy, 33 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 485, 505 (2015) (“During the Roman Empire, the slaughter
of both Christians and animals was carried out as entertainment. Early Christian
theologists emphasized the uniqueness of human beings, and placed great emphasis on
humanity possessing immortal souls, as a way to separate humans from animals, and
encourage greater compassion toward human beings. The idea that human life is
sacrosanct stems from this early Christian theology. Sadly, greater compassion for
animals was left out of this equation, and that dichotomy persists to the present day.
Other religions have been more open to acknowledging that beings other than humans
can possess souls. Some religions claim that plants and rocks have souls.”).
23 See Plass, supra note 13, at n. 72 (“[W]e must care for animals and spare them
unnecessary suffering.” (quoting Statement of the Right Reverend Monsignor LeRoy E.
McWilliams, President of The National Catholic Society for Animal Welfare, 87th Cong.
2d Sess. At 63-65 (Sep. 28 & 29, 1962))); M. Varn Chandola, Dissecting American Animal
Protection Law: Healing the Wounds With Animal Rights and Eastern Enlightenment, 8
WIS. ENVTL. L. J. 3, 6 (2002) (“A diverse array of groups generally agree with the concept
of animal welfare which basically states that cruelty to animals should be minimized to
the extent of not inflicting unnecessary pain and suffering upon them.”).
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thing that creepeth upon the earth.”24 This sentiment lends some insight
into how and why humans might disregard animal welfare.25 But,
perceived human domination over all other creatures in religious
doctrine does not necessarily abrogate the human obligation to animals:
[T]he Qur’an classifies humans as superior to animals and as
occupying a privileged status. As part of this privilege, as
Earth’s conscientious stewards, humans are responsible for
protecting and serving each other as well as the ecosystem.
This framework mandates to humans a responsibility to care
for and protect animals as vicegerents.26
B. Concerns Of Mirrored Behavior
A sharp distinction is necessary between humans and
‘animals’ if we are to bend them to our will, make them work
for us, wear them, eat them—without any disquieting tinges
of guilt or regret. With untroubled consciences, we can render
whole species extinct—for our perceived short-term benefit,

24 Genesis 1:26 (King James). Contra, Ecclesiastes 3:19-20 (King James) (“ For that
which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts; even one thing befalleth them: as the
one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all one breath; so that a man hath no
preeminence above a beast: for all is vanity. All go unto one place; all are of the dust,
and all turn to dust again.”); but see Sullivan, Vietzke, and Coyne, supra note 12, at 1136.
25 See generally Yossi Wolfson, supra note 5, at 157-158. (“The land between the
Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River saw some of the earliest centers of human
civilization, including some of the first stages of the subordination of non-human
animals. This was later also the site of development of some of the oldest laws
protecting non-human animals from their human exploiters—the laws contained in the
Bible. These laws took for granted hierarchy among humans and between humans and
non-humans. Despite some dissenting voices in the Bible that view meat-eating
negatively (Genesis 1, 29; Numbers 11, 4—35; Deuteronomy 12, 20-28; Amos 6, 4 and
more), it generally approved of the exploitation of animals for labor and of their use and
killing for food and for raw materials. Nevertheless, it perceived them as living beings,
sharing the world (on a non-equal basis) with humans, according to an order dictated
by God (Genesis 9, 8-17). True to this ideology, the Bible allows animal exploitation, but
puts limits on it: Animals must be allowed to rest on the Sabbath (Exodus 20, 10;
Deuteronomy 5, 14); an ox may not be muzzled while treading out cereals (Deuteronomy
25, 4); one must unload a donkey that fell under the weight of his burden (Exodus 23, 5);
one may take a bird’s eggs or fledglings—but not together with the mother and not while
she is watching (Deuteronomy 22, 6-7).).
26 Engy Abdelkader, Animal Protection Theory in U.S. and Islamic Law: A Comparative
Analysis with A Human Rights Twist, 14 UCLA J. ISLAMIC AND NEAR E. L. 45, 51 (2015)
(emphasis added); Id. at 57 (“On the one hand, the Qur’an draws similarities between
the animal kingdom and its human counterpart; on the other, animals are subjugated to
human control on an as-needed basis.”); Id. at 56 (“According to the majority view, the
Qur’an permits humans to dominate and benefit from animals for various purposes; the
Hadith explicate that such objectives are necessary. Such purposes, the Qur’an indicates,
include warmth and protection, derived from animals’ wool and fur, food and drink
(such as milk), and the transportation of humans and heavy cargo.”).
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or even through simple carelessness. Their loss is of little
import: Those beings, we tell ourselves, are not like us.27
For those who do not subscribe to animal protection as an
underlying obligation to fellow living beings with whom we share the
earth, perhaps a purely human-centric justification will be persuasive.28
In that realm, we know that abuse of animals by a human correlates
closely to abuse of other humans by that same individual.29
Awareness of the correlation between animal cruelty and
domestic abuse is growing. A survey of fifty of the largest
women’s shelters in the United States showed that eighty-five
percent of women and sixty-three percent of children spoke
of instances of animal abuse in their homes. Batterers often
control and intimidate their victims by abusing or even killing
the victims’ companion animals. Furthermore, children
witnessing animal and domestic abuse are more likely to
become animal abusers themselves.

27 Kniaz, supra note 21, at 770, (quoting CARL SAGAN & ANN DRUYAN, SHADOWS OF
FORGOTTEN ANCESTORS: A SEARCH FOR WHO WE ARE 365 (1992)).
28 See Brieanah Schwartz, Standing on Four Legs or Two?, 4 MID-ATLANTIC J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 202, 226 (2018) (“This holding implies that the purpose of animal cruelty statutes
is to determine whether the perpetrator meant to inflict harm on the owner. Therefore,
Garcia stands for a human-centric approach to animal protection statutes, where the
animal harmed can stand to benefit if there is a claim benefitting the human owner.”);
Darian M. Ibrahim, The Anticruelty Statute: A Study in Animal Welfare, 1 J. ANIMAL L. &
ETHICS 175, 178 (2006) (“To determine whether an animal is subjected to unnecessary
suffering, the human interests from animal exploitation must be balanced against the
animal interests in not suffering. If the human interest prevails in any given situation,
the animal suffering is permitted; if the animal interest prevails, the suffering is not
permitted.”).
29 Plass, supra note 13, at 420 (“By collecting data about violent incarcerated men,
individuals prosecuted for intentional cruelty to animals, serial killers, and violent
juvenile offenders, among others, it was determined that these individuals abused
animals at a much higher rate than their non-violent counterparts. Based on such
studies, it is then suggested that animal abuse is part of the developmental history of
violent adults, and so, in some sense, animal abuse is a dress rehearsal or training
ground for later violence against other humans.”); see also Chandola supra note 23, at 56 (“[S]tudies by behavioral scientists also reveal the correlation between cruelty to
animals and violent crime. Studies have shown that a statistically significant number of
criminals who committed acts of violence against humans have a history of cruelty to
animals. Prosecutors are gradually realizing that violent acts directed towards humans
and animals are not separate distinct forms of violence, but are part of a cycle. Although
research concerning the relationship between violence against humans and animals is
relatively recent, it is definitely not a novel idea. In 1887, the Supreme Court of
Mississippi in an opinion delivered by Justice Arnold, stated that it was important for
society to consider the welfare of animals. The Court noted that animals were probably
capable of feeling as much pain and pleasure as humans.”).
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A study surveying women’s shelters in Northern Utah
substantiates the animal abuse and interpersonal violence
correlation. The study found that seventy-four percent of the
women entering the shelter had a companion animal or had
owned one within the last twelve months. Of these women,
seventy-one percent reported that their partner had either
threatened to harm––or actually harmed––a companion
animal. Many of the abusive partners were actively violent
toward the animals: actual harm or killing of animals was
reported by [fifty-seven percent] of the women with pets and
included acts of omission (e.g., neglecting to feed or allow
veterinary care) but most often acts of violence. Examples
reported included slapping, shaking, throwing, or shooting
dogs and cats, drowning a cat in a bathtub, and pouring lighter
fluid on a kitten and igniting it. 30
Cross-reporting laws also exist for animal cruelty and child abuse.31
“These laws recognize the concept that if one member of a household is
being neglected or mistreated, then it is possible that other members
might be as well.”32 In this context, the fact that an animal member of
the household is subject to neglect or mistreatment triggers concern
that human members of the same household are suffering the same
abuse.33
C. Species Supremacy
The biased human tendency to discredit animal welfare rests upon
a foundation of human superiority.34 This perceived superiority is
disquieting because it resembles, in so many ways, the same belief
systems that support any other form of perceived supremacy and
resultant oppression. The supremacist believes that anybody who does

30 Blair McCrory & Shannon Douglass, 2006 Legislative Review, 13 ANIMAL L. 299,
312-313 (Marjorie A. Berger ed.) (2007). See also, Constance Lindner, Domestic Abuse
and Protecting Pets, CATNIP (CUMMINGS SCHOOL OF VETERINARY MEDICINE AT TUFTS UNIVERSITY)
7-9 (October 2016).
31 See Jonathan R. Lovvorn, Animal Law In Action: The Law, Public Perception, And
The Limits Of Animal Rights Theory As A Basis For Legal Reform, 12 ANIMAL L. 133, 134135 (2006); see also Berger, supra note 30, at 315 (“2. Cross Reporting. Protective orders
for animals were not the only legislative acknowledgement of a correlation between
domestic abuse and animal cruelty this year. West Virginia and Tennessee both passed
laws that require the cross reporting of animal cruelty and child abuse.”).
32 Berger, supra note 30, at 315.
33 Berger, supra note 30, at 315.
34 See generally Colb, supra note 18, at 220 (“Singer has long demanded that we stop
ignoring the moral implications of using animals. He has compared such speciesism to
racism . . . . Regan also resisted speciesism.”).
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not align in certain designated traits with him/her is inferior.35 This sort
of species supremacy enables humans to justify condescension towards
the animal kingdom.36
35

See Yxta Maya Murray, From Here I Saw What Happened And I Cried: Carrie Mae
Weems’ Challenge To The Harvard Archive, 8 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 1, 65 (201213), (“In an almost eerie—but in hindsight, predictable—synchronicity, Trope and EchoHawk cite Samuel George Morton’s head-hunting raids of Native American bodies as an
impetus for the law. As noted above, Morton’s policy of crania-collecting and measuring
supposedly proved Indians’ separate species genesis as well as their inferiority. Agassiz
drew much inspiration from Morton’s collection of 600 Native American crania and used
Morton’s measurements as support for his separate, inferior species theory. The
resulting demotion of Native Americans led to their capture in reservations, and served
as a justification for genocide.”); see also Megan A. Senatori, The Second Revolution: The
Diverging Paths of Animal Activism And Environmental Law, 8 WIS.ENVNTL.L.J. 31, 36
(2002) (“In 1975, philosopher Peter Singer began a second revolution, this time
challenging humankind’s homocentric view of the worth of animals. Singer’s
controversial book, ANIMAL LIBERATION, emerged as another call to consciousness
arguing that what allows human beings to completely disregard the worth of animals is
a form of discrimination known as ‘speciesism.’ According to Singer, speciesism ‘is a
prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of one’s own species
and against those of members of other species.’ Singer argues that even the most
ordinary humans rationalize the inhumane treatment of animals by simply viewing the
interests of their own species as superior to those of other life forms. Harvard Law
Professor and animal law scholar, Steven M. Wise, calls this phenomenon ‘teleological
anthropocentrism,’ or a notion that the universe was designed solely to serve human
beings.”). But see Maneesha Deckha, Holding Onto Humanity: Animals, Dignity, and
Anxiety in Canada’s Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 5 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 21,
53-54 (2009) (“While the fluidity and constructedness of species are acknowledged in
contemporary biology, the social construction of species difference persists and
continues to be inflected by currents of race, gender, culture, sexuality and other
seemingly anthropogenic concepts. There is a continuing impulse to articulate human
identity as the marker for ethical consideration and animal identity as the excluded
Other. The AHRA participates in this modernist narrative, defining human dignity in
relation to animal commodification. In embodying commodification and species anxiety
through its prohibitive provisions, the AHRA contributes to this long-standing narrative
within Western cultures of articulating, with mixed success, human identity through
juxtaposing it with imagined ideas of animality.”), and Taimie L. Bryant, Trauma, Law,
And Advocacy For Animals, 1 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 63, 109 (May, 2006) (“For most of
human history, other animals and humans were largely cohabiters - a reality
conditioned by the foraging way of life. Changing climatic conditions facilitated the
emergence of hunting. This change in the method of material accumulation was
necessarily accompanied by ideas that assuaged human guilt, ideas that were embedded
in social and religious practices and beliefs. The ascent of agricultural society gradually
transformed human oppression of other animals into a mundane practice. Interhuman
relationships also changed profoundly during these periods, and not for the better. The
mistreatment of humans and other animals was not stimulated by prejudice; rather,
prejudice resulted from the socially constructed ideological systems that legitimated
oppression.”).
36 See Jay Shooster, Justice For All: Including Animal Rights In Social Justice Activism,
40 HARBINGER 39, 40-41 (OCTOBER 15, 2015) (“Social justice advocates recognize that
treating someone differently solely because of their race, class, gender, nationality,
sexual orientation, or disability is almost always wrong. That is because we know that
for almost all decisions, these characteristics are morally irrelevant. Just like racism,
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Animal protection ultimately relies upon the value that humans
place upon the well-being of non-humans.37 In order to engage in a
rational, methodical, and ethical evaluation of animal treatment, we
must avoid seeking some mythical convergence of an intersection
between human and animal. Instead, the inquiry should ask who and

sexism, and classism, speciesism focuses on one morally arbitrary characteristic:
species, and uses that to justify violence and inequality. After all, what does a number
of chromosomes or an opposable thumb have to do with whether or not someone should
live or die?”); Daniel Mishori, Environmental Vegetarianism: Conflicting Principles,
Constructive Virtues, 11 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 253, 263 (Nov. 2017) (“The common
denominator between evolving ecological ethics and the animal rights movement was
opposition to the idea of human supremacy over all other creatures, which in 1970 was
termed by British psychologist Richard D. Ryder ‘speciesism.’ The biocentric claim that
animals have ‘rights’, which was articulated in various ways (including utilitarian and
deontological ethics), implied that humans have duties to animals, such as the obligation
to shield them from harm and exploitation. Speciesism was seen as a form of
discrimination and oppression, on par with other notorious types of prejudice such as
racism, sexism and ageism.”); Joseph Lubinski, Screw The Whales, Save Me! The
Endangered Species Act, Animal Protection, And Civil Rights, 4 J. L. SOCIETY 377, 401-402
(Winter 2003) (“Other animal advocates have compared human ‘speciesism’ to
invidious forms of discrimination such as racism and sexism. Gary Francione turns the
degrading practice of treating humans as property on its head by equating it to the
impropriety of treating animals as property. He further compares the historical
exploitation of people with our current exploitation of animals.”).
37 See infra note 52 and accompanying text. See also, David S. Favre, Judicial
Recognition Of The Interests Of Animals ‐ A New Tort, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV 333, 363-364
(Summer 2005) (“It is not expected that any animal has the capacity to call a lawyer and
initiate a lawsuit . . . . The courts are capable of discerning when a particular human is
the appropriate party to pursue the interests of an animal. In an indirect manner, two
federal courts have allowed humans to pursue cases that furthered the interests of
animals covered by federal law. In at least one case in Florida, a court appointed a
guardian ad litem for a Chimpanzee Trust. The development of guidelines for the courts
in resolving this issue will undoubtedly be the subject of future law review articles. Our
legal system has a number of mechanisms such as guardianships, next friends, legal
representatives and social workers to deal with this issue.”); Antoinette Duck, Welcome
To Primates’ Paradise, Human Rights Not Allowed: Unravelling The Great Ape Project, 7
REGENT J. INT’L L. 165, 185 (2009) (“The responsibilities and duties that exist toward
animals are uniquely and specifically human. Why? Because man is a moral being, and
the animal is not. Animals do not protect other animals’ rights. Animals are not subject
to ‘animal duties’ toward one another. Rather, ‘animals’ rights’ are asserted against
humanity, against mankind. If being human is not what burdens man with the obligation
to treat animals humanely, then nothing does. It is man’s humanity that burdens him
with his duty toward the animals. It is man’s humanity that burdens him with the
responsibility of stewardship.”); Tischler, supra note 22, at 492-493 (2015) (“So, why do
humans have legal rights? Do they descend from the heavens? No; legal rights come
from us. As I mentioned earlier, human beings have been property. In the past 150
years in the U.S., the social contract about who gets rights, and who gets legal
“personhood” protection, has expanded to include: people of color, women, children,
gays, lesbians, transgender people, immigrants, Native Americans, people with mental
and physical disabilities, and children. Legal rights are established by us to protect our
lives, our families, our property, and our values. And they evolve.”).
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what we want to be as humans.38 The answer to this question
necessarily includes an underlying human obligation towards the
welfare of other living creatures and our planet.39
Analyzing and viewing animal rights legislation in this context
removes us from a confined perspective of human superiority and
launches us in the direction of enlightened care and concern for those
subjected to our collective human will.40 Mere dominion need not
equate to superiority:
Here is the myth to make human beings feel their supremacy
and their power. Man alone is made in the image of God. Man
alone is given dominion over all the animals and told to
subdue the earth. . . . The influence of Judeo-Christian
insistence on the God-like nature of human beings is nowhere
more apparent than in the standard Western doctrine of the
sanctity of human life: a doctrine that puts the life of the most
hopelessly and irreparably brain damaged human being—of

38 See Favre, supra note 37, at 363-364; Duck, supra note 37, at 185. See also, Plass,
supra note 13, at 404 (“It is contended, for example, that the criterion for legal protection
should be a living entity’s ability to suffer, as non-human animals certainly can and do.
It is further contended that non-human animals, like humans, are ‘subjects of a life’ with
beliefs, desires, emotions, identity, and other attributes of personhood that support the
recognition of rights, and in that sense are equal. Another perspective explains that
animal rights theory is grounded in principles of ‘justice,’ which reject the use of animals
as property. That is to say animals have equal inherent value as humans and therefore
are entitled to the same considerations as humans when decisions that affect their
interests are being made.”).
39 See Wenner, supra note 17, at 1631 (“The law governing animal welfare is
convoluted. Animals receive some protection from maltreatment through state anticruelty statutes. These statutes typically guard only against wanton abuse that has no
societally legitimate purpose. They also tend to exempt common agricultural practices,
meaning that as long as a particular method is standard within the industry, it is not
cruel under the statute. On the other hand, under the regulatory system at both the
federal and state level, specific animals are sometimes afforded a level of ‘humane’
protection that exceeds what would otherwise be provided under the anti-cruelty
statutes. These laws prohibit activities that would not necessarily violate anti-cruelty
statutes because they are not wanton—there is a purpose behind the pain and suffering
inflicted on the animal—but they are characterized as inhumane nonetheless.. Through
the use of humane standards, the regulatory system provides certain limited chances to
exceed the baseline protections offered under anti-cruelty statutes. However, if we are
to ensure that regulations properly address relevant concerns and honestly represent
our convictions and interests, courts must be willing to scrutinize agency regulations.
Though states have different approaches to promulgating humane standards of care and
different standards of review, one thing should remain clear: The humane treatment of
animals is as much about us as it is about them. ‘Humane’ should not be defined without
questioning the value we place on animal pain and suffering, and, consequently, judicial
review of agency action should ensure that this value is actually determined.”).
40 See Wenner, supra note 17, at 1631.
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the kind whose level of awareness is not underestimated by
the term ‘human vegetable’—above the life of a chimpanzee.41
Service animals exemplify the idea of species supremacy. Service
animals and companion animals have become valued by society, not
because of their status as animals, but because of their ability to serve
human needs and hold economic value by virtue of their training and
knowledge.42
The fact that humans own animals necessarily implicates a
linguistic bias regarding treatment. “Ownership implies entitlements to
the owner [but] . . . it does not necessarily translate into a right to do as
one pleases…”43 Granting “person” status to animals does not address
the underlying bias in ownership, however, because “[m]erely
abolishing the property status of animals and granting them rights does
not guarantee that they will cease to be exploited.”44
D. Anthropomorphism Or Simply Respect For Another Living Being?
“Anthropomorphism” is the human trait of “[g]iving human
characteristics to animals, inanimate objects or natural phenomena.”45
41 Plass, supra note 13, at 415, (quoting PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 2-8 (2d. ed.
1990)).
42 Sullivan, Vietzke, and Coyne, supra note 12, at 1129-1130 (“In any discussion
concerning animal rights, the question often arises as to the need to distinguish
companion animals, like dogs and cats, from other animals. Clearly, it is an easier
argument to limit animal rights to our companion animals who occupy our homes and
are near and dear to us. However, such a distinction is too great a strain on science and
compassion for us to promote without exploring the issue a bit deeper. Although it
would be easy to give into the distinction between companion animals and other
animals, to do so ignores the fact that non-companion animals, like chimpanzees, have a
genetic make-up very similar to ours. They also have the capacity to experience great
pain. So to suggest that Rover or Kitty have rights and value beyond property, but a
chimp does not, leads to an absurd conclusion: chimps can be seen as mere objects.
Chimps can experience a broad array of emotions like joy, grief, and sadness. They are
extremely intelligent and often serve as helpers to the disabled. Their genetic make-up
is nearly identical to ours. So why should this living, breathing, and thinking being—
sometimes thinking even more than we do according to Japanese researchers—be
relegated to the equivalent of the chair we sit on? Cruelty and humane treatment of
animals aside, tort law, contract law, wills and trusts law, and family law all deal with
issues regarding companion animals (with the exception of actions for damages to
livestock where the law actually grants more protection to the animals so long as it is
part of one’s livelihood).”). Id.
43 Robert Garner, Political Ideology And The Legal Status Of Animals, 8 ANIMAL L. 77,
81 (2002).
44 Id. at 80.
45 Rick Nauert, Why Do We Anthropomorphize?, PSYCHCENTRAL (Mar. 1, 2010; last
updated June 15, 2019), http://psychcentral.com/news/2010/03/01/why-do-weanthropomorphize/11766.html. “[A]nthropomorphism was coined by the Greek
philosopher Xenophanes when describing the similarity between religious believers
and their gods—that is, Greek gods were depicted having light skin and blue eyes while

ANDERSON (DO NOT DELETE)

50

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

2/8/2021 5:52 PM

[Vol. 45:1

The notion that many humans attribute to animals the capacity to
experience pain, happiness, and other feelings should not engender
condescending proclamations from others that one’s empathy towards
another living being is a form of radical extremism and
anthropomorphization.46 Indeed, failure to consider how other living
beings, including animals, are impacted by one’s behavior appears to
controvert the golden rule: “Do unto others as you would have them do
unto you.”47
Similar to humans, animals have subjective experiences and are
conscious of the world around them. In discussing the commonalities of
human and animal behavior, Professor Brian Frye argued:
Indeed, it is at least possible that all living things have some
form of subjective experience and are conscious of the world
in some way, even if we cannot possibly comprehend their
subjective experience or consciousness. Not only mammals
but also reptiles and fish can be trained to solve problems.
Insects engage in complicated social behaviors. The lowly
flatworm makes choices. And even plants respond to external
stimuli.48
Is it possible that my cat engages in zoomorphism, the act of
attributing animal traits to humans? To me, she may be attributing
sensory abilities, hunting skills, and other aspects of existence based
upon her capacities as a sentient living being. Perhaps this is why she
will lay fearlessly in the middle of the floor at night, not realizing that
my night vision skills are far short of her keen abilities. Does this mean
that my cat’s perceptions of me are entirely faulty? Of course not;
although I may not possess the exact level of abilities that she attributes
to me (but certainly am guilty of the numerous flaws that she observes
African gods had dark skin and brown eyes.” Id. See generally, Tischler supra note 22 at
504 (“And while I like to rely on scientific studies for support of my positions, I regret
that scientists often seem unwilling to advocate for animals, out of a fear that they will
be criticized by their colleagues. For example, certain scientists have witnessed animals
exhibiting emotions, yet they refuse to compare that behavior to a human-like response
in their published reports, because they don’t want to be accused of being
anthropomorphic. But when you read reports, such as the one I mentioned earlier, of an
elephant flopping-down on the ground and weeping, what are you going to think? Why
is the elephant doing that? I presume the elephant is doing it for the same reason I
would; well, I don’t flop down and cry too often, but isn’t it rational to assume that the
elephant is acting out frustration, anger, or exasperation? I can only assume that. Why
else would she do that?”).
46 See Tischler, supra note 22, at 504.
47 See generally Bill Puka, The Golden Rule, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,
https://www.iep.utm.edu/goldrule/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2020).
48 Brian L. Frye, The Lion, The Bat & The Thermostat: Metaphors On Consciousness, 5
SAVANNAH L. REV. 13, 40 (2018).

ANDERSON (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

2/8/2021 5:52 PM

CALIFORNIA’S “BAN” ON FOIE GRAS

51

in me), there is a reasonable line of commonality that we share in our
existence as living beings. Either of us attributing some sort of shared
commonality of existence neither makes my cat a zoomorphist, nor I an
anthropomorphist. We are simply applying our respective knowledge
and experiences in an effort to understand and afford respect to each
other as living beings. Labels of anthropomorphism evade the fact that
“animals are sentient beings based on their capacity to suffer and
thereby entitled to equal consideration of their interests.”49
III. COARSE, MEDIUM, OR FINE? A PROPOSED “FILTER” BASED
TAXONOMY TO AID IN THE ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATION RELATED TO
ANIMAL TREATMENT
A. An Overview
“Whether animals are the primary or secondary subjects of laws,
or regulated for their own or human welfare, their legal treatment is
defined by human interest.”50
My proposed filter is intended as another tool to aid in revealing
the strengths, weaknesses, and flaws in animal legislation. Envision a
cone-shaped filter, like a coffee filter, but with three different stages of
filtration. My proposal is that human-centric legislation is most
appropriate for analysis at the coarse level; blended legislation that
considers aspects of both animal and human protection is appropriate
at the medium level of filtration; and animal-centric protective
legislation proceeds into the fine level for additional analysis and
discussion.
This coffee filter analogy provides an additional approach to help
analyze, debate, and discuss animal rights legislation, regardless of
where an individual resides on the spectrum of animal protection.
Analyzing animal rights legislation under the coffee filter analogy may
also help fuel continuing improvements in such legislation.
The proposed filter can also be used to help identify issues of
interest convergence and legal gerrymandering. Borrowing from the
helpful terminology of animal protection expert Dr. Ani Satz, for
example, there is an interest convergence in the foie gras ban that brings
together those opposed to consuming animals and those who do
consume animal flesh, but oppose the force-feeding method of
production.51 Simultaneously, there is legal gerrymandering in the law

49
50
51

Satz, supra note 16, at 76.
Satz, supra note 16, at 83.
Satz, supra note 16, at 69.
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that protects ducks and geese raised for foie gras, but does not protect
those same animals when they are raised for meat sale or other
purposes.52 This legal gerrymandering potentially “both undermines
fundamental protections for animals and creates legal
inconsistencies.”53 The filter is also intended to aid in identifying these
types of issues.54
B. Is There Really A Need To Discuss Animal Protection Legislation?
Recognized animal protection proponent Jonathan Lovvorn has
indicated that the key to humane treatment of animals may require
sequestration into boundaries that the human masses can relate to.55
We can make a good start by jettisoning our own
revolutionary rhetoric - such as granting animals
‘personhood’ or otherwise eliminating the property status of
animals. It is an intellectual indulgence and a vice for animal
lawyers to concern ourselves with the advancement of such
impractical theories while billions of animal languish in
unimaginable suffering that we have the power to change.56
Other than recognizing our duties as humans to be stewards and
protectors of non-human animals, why is the discussion of animal rights
legislation relevant? The answer is that modern technology, food
production, and medical research continue to progress in a direction
that demands and requires attention.57
High-tech factory farming techniques allow American
agribusiness to raise and slaughter more than ten billion
animals in the United States each year. By supporting the
confinement of animals to factory floors, technology requires
newer and more sophisticated interventions to maintain the
confinement, such as antibiotics and hormones. Technology
drives the use of millions more animals in biomedical
research. At the same time, it is because of technological
advances in research techniques that animal advocates can
credibly press for substitutes for some experimental animals.
New uses of animal organs in humans, as well as the cloning
and genetic manipulation of animals, are likely to increase the

52

Satz, supra note 16, at 83.
Satz, supra note 16, at 83. See also infra notes 123-125 and accompanying text.
54 See generally Satz, supra note 16, at 83.
55 See Lovvorn, supra note 31, at 139.
56 Lovvorn, supra note 31, at 139.
57 Ellen P. Goodman, Animal Ethics and the Law, 79 TEMP L. REV. 1291, 95-96 (2006)
(reviewing CASS R. SUNDSTEIN AND MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, EDS., ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES
AND NEW DIRECTIONS (2004)).
53
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demand for animal exploitation while raising new questions
about human duties to animals.58
C. The Filter In Action
In order to exemplify application of the filter, below is a description
of each filter stage, along with discussion of pertinent theories at each
stage of filtration. It is impossible to cover all possible theories relevant
at each level of the filter, but the examples below provide a foundational
understanding of how the filter works. Why the filter? It would be
unproductive and counterintuitive to analyze human-centric legislation
(e.g. food safety) within the context of animal rights theories, or vice
versa.
1. Coarse Filtration: Human Centric
“I got no emotions for anybody else; You better understand I’m in
love with myself; myself; my beautiful self; No feelings . . . for anybody
else.”59 Coarse filtration involves regulation motivated entirely by
human self-interest.60 Legislation at this stage of the filter is based
exclusively upon human benefit. Any benefit to animals at the coarse
stage is purely an unintended secondary result.
The coarse level is relevant for inclusion in this analysis because
laws related to animals often focus on human safety rather than animal
treatment.61
Animals receive legal protections only when their interests
align with human interests. Consider the following examples.
Animals are not slaughtered prior to being ‘rendered
insensible’ because of the cruelty involved as well as the
reduced hazard for slaughterhouse workers, efficiency in
processing, and economic gains associated with decreased
bruising of flesh foods. Downed pigs and sheep (animals too
sick to stand) are not dragged or hauled to slaughter unless an
inspector deems them fit for human consumption. Animals in
laboratories are entitled to enough shelter and food to keep
58

Id.
SEX PISTOLS, No Feelings, on NEVER MIND THE BOLLOCKS: HERE’S THE SEX PISTOLS (Virgin
Records 1977).
60 See Satz, supra note 16, at 67-68.
61 Satz, supra note 16, at 85 (“Farm animals have no federal protections pertaining
to their confinement or rearing because factory farms are the most efficient, and
arguable the only, means to produce enough flesh foods to meet existing consumer
demand.”). See also id. (“Haley’s Act, named after a young woman killed by a Siberian
tiger while posing for a high school senior photo, would ban the use of large cats outside
of sanctuaries and zoos because of their danger to humans, not because of the cruelty
involved in keeping a large cat outside of its native environment.”).
59
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them alive to facilitate research. Companion animals are
protected against cruelty in every state because of a desire to
prevent harm to them as well as the value humans place on
their relationships with them and the link between animal
cruelty and violence against humans.62
Food safety laws designed to protect human consumers of animal
flesh or other animal food products appear at the coarse filtration level
because these laws are about human interests, not animal protection.63
Laws focused exclusively or primarily upon human safety in interacting
with animals also fall within this category. Laws filtered at the coarse
level do not actually constitute animal protection or animal rights laws,
even though some humans may mischaracterize them as such.
A sample of theories associated with the coarse level of filtration
include Descartes’ Theory, Moral Pluralism, and Chattel Theory.
a. Descartes’ Theory
It is well-settled that key philosophers, including Socrates,
Aristotle, and Descartes, embraced the theory of absolute human
superiority over animal welfare.64 “[P]hilosophers, like Rene Descartes,
believed animals were machines without consciousness that could be
dismantled, reconstructed, and discarded.”65 This brutal ideology, and
62 Satz, supra note 16, at 67-68. See also, Geoffrey C. Evans, Comment, To What
Extent Does Wealth Maximization Benefit Farmed Animals? A Law and Economics
Approach to a Ban on Gestation Crates in Pig Production, 13 ANIMAL L. 167, 170 (2006)
(“Farmed animals in particular have very little protection in the United States. . . . Most
states’ anticruelty statutes exempt ‘accepted,’ ‘common,’ ‘customary,’ or ‘normal’
farming practices. . . . [and] exclude poultry, which represent an estimated 95% of the
. . . farm animals slaughtered annually.”).
63 See Satz, supra note 16, at 69-70 (“Animal laws are also the product of interestconvergence. Despite their nomenclature, animal welfare and anti-cruelty statutes
protect human as well as animal interests. The problem with providing animal
protections in this manner is that when human and animal interests conflict, animal
protections are reduced or eliminated to facilitate human use of animals. Even one of
the most basic animal interests—avoiding suffering—is ignored. Animals are anally
shocked to death, drowned, suffocated, or gassed, so as not to damage their furs for
fashion garments; subject to invasive experiments without appropriate pain relief or
sedation to prevent drug interference with experimental results; tethered on short leads
without sufficient shelter, food, or water for the entirety of their lives as guard animals;
and intensively confined in dark, windowless warehouses for efficient meat production
after being routinely castrated, de-beaked, and de-toed without anesthesia.”).
64 See Denise R. Case, The USA Patriot Act: Adding Bite to the Fight Against Animal
Rights Terrorism? 34 RUTGERS L.J. 187, 190 n.12 (2003) (“In addition to religious
sentiments against animals, well known philosophers, such as Socrates, Aristotle, and
Descartes wrote about human superiority.”) (citing TOM REGAN, ALL THAT DWELL THEREIN:
ANIMAL RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 5 (1982); STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE:
TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS 17 (2000)).
65 See Satz, supra note 16, at 63 n.3.
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lack of compassion towards animals, is perhaps rooted in the belief that
animals are automatons that do not feel pain or other emotions;
therefore, any abuse is “unfelt” by the animal.66 Even if one is willing to
adopt such underlying assumptions, the justification for Descartes’ view
still falls flat on its face as it fails to provide accountability for human
behavior, regardless of how or what animals might perceive or feel.
Whether animals can experience pain would not have been a
question were it not for the mechanistic views of philosopher
Rene Descartes that led the way to wholesale abuses of
animals in the name of science. Descartes contended that
animals responded to stimuli the way a clock chimes—purely
automatically and without sensation or the desire to
communicate.67
Applying Descartes’ views to the California foie gras law, there
would be no reason to restrict the feeding methods, as the subject
animal purportedly lacks the ability to feel any pain from such
methods.68
Descartes’ views about animal pain and emotion are unsound,
however, when contextually analyzed by any person who has interacted
with domestic or wild animals.69 Why would any animal howl, squeal,
or otherwise outcry specifically when subjected to pain stimuli if that
animal did not feel pain? One cannot credibly argue that the animal is
merely mimicking what a human would do in the same situation.
Moreover, why would an animal inflict pain upon others (humans or
66 See Satz, supra note 16, at 63 n.3. See also Chandola, supra note 23, at 19-20 (“Rene
Descartes, the great French philosopher and mathematician who did not deviate from
traditional western religious thought regarding animals, established the precedent in
modern thinking that animals were like machines or automata without souls or
consciousness. During Descartes’ period, in the seventeenth century, vivisection
became widespread in Europe where many of the leading scientists referred to
themselves as ‘cartesians’ in reference to Descartes’ theory that animals were similar to
mechanical entities. While painful experiments were starting to be performed on
animals, vivisection also revealed the great similarity between animals and humans.”).
67 Taimie L. Bryan, Trauma, Law, and Advocacy for Animals, 1 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 63,
109 n.124 (2006).
68 See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
69 See Chandola, supra note 23, at 14 (“Tom Regan, who is credited with being the
founder of the animal rights view, argues that those nonhuman animals which possess
various attributes such as perception, memory, ability to feel pain and suffering,
psychophysical identity, and an ability to act in accordance with beliefs and desires
possess inherent value. All beings possessing inherent value who share interests based
on a relevant similarity must have such interests treated equally. An interest in
attending college is not a relevant similarity shared by human and nonhuman animals,
but there exists a common interest in avoiding pain and suffering. Such relevant
interests must be protected by rights in accordance with the respect principle or duty of
justice.”) See also, Tischler supra note 22, at 504.
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animals) when defending itself through biting, scratching, or other
conduct, if the subject animal did not conceptually understand the
concept and feeling of pain?
b. Moral Pluralism
To eat animals, or not to eat animals; that is the question. Dr.
Robert Garner has evaluated the perspectives that allow humans to eat
animals, or not to eat animals, in the context of moral pluralism.70 Dr.
Garner posits that although there is room for animal rights in the
theories of John Rawls, Brian Barry, and other leading political
philosophers, traditional notions of animal welfare do not integrate into
the framework of modern justice in our system of jurisprudence.71
“[H]uman ‘conduct toward animals is not regulated by the principles of
justice, because only “moral persons . . . [are] entitled to equal
justice.”‘“72
Rawls’ approach to the theory of justice requires those protected
by justice to have “a conception of their good [as expressed by a rational
plan of life] . . . and . . . a sense of justice, a normally effective desire to

70 Garner, supra note 43, at 89 (“It is very noticeable how much human choice is
invoked in the debate about animal welfare. This illustrates the influence of the moral
pluralism central to most liberal theories. From the moral pluralism viewpoint, we are
free to choose whether to eat free-range meat or not to eat meat at all, free to avoid
hunting or fishing, free to visit zoos, and free to resist drugs developed by using animals.
What we are not entitled to do under this principle, however, is to prevent others from
eating intensively produced meat, or going hunting and fishing, or visiting zoos, or
partaking in drugs developed through animal testing, just because some of us find such
activities morally repugnant. The state, therefore, must remain neutral when it comes
to competing conceptions of the moral status of animals.”).
71 Garner, supra note 43, at 87-88 (“The problem occurs where, as in the liberalism
associated with Rawls, and other leading names in political philosophy such as Brian
Barry, the harm principle does not apply because animals are excluded from a theory of
justice . . . . Despite excluding animals from a theory of justice, Rawls, Barry, and others
clearly accept that what is done to animals matters morally, and that there should be
some restrictions on the way they are treated. This apparent contradiction can be
explained by the fact that these thinkers seem to be making the point that justice is a
much narrower area of inquiry than ethics . . . . Rawls is arguing that the treatment of
animals should be discussed in the arena of morals rather than the arena of justice.
However, the effect of excluding animals from a theory of justice is problematic for
animals in a liberal society because a basic principle of most liberal theories is the
assumption that it is no business of a liberal society to advocate one conception of the
good over another. In other words, any genuine liberal political theory must include an
anti-perfectionist principle of moral pluralism. This is the idea, derived from a wider
theory of liberty, that it is no business of the state or society to interfere in individual
moral codes or individual conceptions of the good life . . . . Taking this liberal theory to
its logical conclusion, the treatment of animals becomes a matter of individual moral
choice rather than a matter of justice.”).
72 Garner, supra note 43, at 87.
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apply and to act upon the principles of justice . . .”73 Dr. Garner notes
that under this rationale, “only those who can understand what it is to
be just, and are able to claim it for themselves and respect the rights of
others, are entitled to be beneficiaries of justice.”74 There are notable
flaws in using the capacity to understand and respect the rights of others
as the basis for justice. “[P]ersons who are senile may not have the
capacity to use tools, language, or exhibit a high intellect; yet, they are
still rights holders.”75
Under Rawls’ philosophy, objective notions of justice fall short of
application to animals. Dr. Garner observes that justice is merely a small
region contained within the greater realm of ethics and morals.76 Within
the context of ethics and morals, Rawls’ theory, and other modern
political theories, affords individuals the ability to choose to engage in
animal protection but fails to afford broader societal protection of
animals.
As a result of this moral pluralism,
we are free to choose whether to eat free-range meat or not to
eat meat at all, free to avoid hunting or fishing, free to visit
zoos, and free to resist drugs developed by using animals.
What we are not entitled to do under this principle, however,
is to prevent others from eating intensively produced meat, or
going hunting and fishing, or visiting zoos, or partaking in
drugs developed through animal testing, just because some of
us find such activities morally repugnant. The state, therefore,
must remain neutral when it comes to competing conceptions
of the moral status of animals.77
Under Rawls’ theory of justice, personal choice allows the
individual to be vegetarian, to buy free range and organic meats, and to
avoid consumption of veal, foie gras, or other arguably “cruel” forms of
animal products.78 “Taking this liberal theory to its logical conclusion,

73

Garner, supra note 43, at 87-88.
Garner, supra note 43, at 88.
75 Kniaz, supra note 21, at 771.
76 Garner, supra note 43, at 87-89, 91 (“There is convincing evidence that differential
animal protection achievements can be explained by the impact of political and social
factors, backed by a dominant form of liberalism in the United States that excludes
animals from a theory of justice. According to this liberal doctrine of moral pluralism,
individuals should be left alone to pursue their own conceptions of the good life, and the
state and society should not intervene to impose one particular moral code over
another. As a result, the treatment of animals becomes subject to moral preferences
rather than legal compulsion.”)
77 Garner, supra note 43, at 89.
78 See Garner, supra note 43, at 87-88.
74
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the treatment of animals becomes a matter of individual moral choice
rather than a matter of justice.”79
The California foie gras legislation would be unnecessary under
moral pluralism, as each individual could decide to eat, or not eat, foie
gras or any other animal product. Although animal welfare may align
with individual choices, moral pluralism lacks the pervasiveness of
societal protection to qualify for use beyond the coarse level of filtration.
In its human centric basis, moral pluralism is founded in individual
choice, rather than societal obligation.
c. Speciesist Utilitarianism
I’ve elected to demarcate this category as “speciesist
utilitarianism,” which is human centric, in order to clearly differentiate
it from utilitarian theories that consider the suffering of animals.80 A
utilitarian analysis of any activity depends upon the cost-benefit
formula used to appraise the underlying utility.81 From the perspective
of the animal used to produce foie gras, there is infinite cost and zero
benefit. Since humans are the ones ascribing utilitarian value in a costbenefit analysis, however, utilitarianism is rife with human-centric
focus.82 The subjectivity of such a cost-benefit analysis is problematic,
as it can only be reconciled by agreeing upon some basic paradigm to
guide the ascription of value. Speciesist utilitarianism, where only
human desires are considered, is encompassed within the coarse level
of filtration because the equation of utility is exclusively human focused.
Utilitarian analysis could be deployed in a non-speciesist manner
to account for the suffering of other living creatures and value of life,
79

Garner, supra note 43, at 88.
See generally PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION: THE DEFINITIVE CLASSIC OF THE ANIMAL
MOVEMENT (Harper Perennial ed. 2009); Colb, supra note 18; Barnaby E. McLaughlin, A
Conspiracy of Life: A Posthumanist Critique of Approaches to Animal Rights in the Law, 14
U.MASS. L. REV. 150, 157-58 (2019).
81 See generally Goodman, supra note 57, at 1293 (“Rights-based arguments
compete with distinctly utilitarian traditions, which recognize in animals no inviolable
rights . . .”).
82 Goodman, supra note 57, at 1298-99 (“Epstein, among others, notes the problem
of measuring pleasures and pains. The social utility in human-to-human interactions
can in theory be measured by a person’s willingness to pay for pleasure or to avoid pain.
According to this measure, an action causes more pleasure than pain if the winners still
come out ahead after compensating the losers for their pain. Such a calculation is
impossible across species.”); see also McLaughlin, supra note 80, at 158 (“While
utilitarianism does a great deal to challenge the Cartesian world, it ultimately fails to
escape a humanist discourse. Though never articulated specifically, utilitarian
insistence on ‘suffering’ as the prerequisite, applied analytically and dispassionately,
does little to articulate animals having interests in and of themselves that may be
separate from simply a shared and identifiable human-like ‘suffering.’”).
80
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thus producing an equation that is not a reflection of the pure pleasure
or monetary interests founded in a human centric scheme.83 Those
alternative utilitarian influenced paradigms, allowing for some
consideration of animal welfare, fall outside of the coarse level of
filtration, and are further addressed later in this Article.
The Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (“AETA”) is an example of
legislation within the realm of speciesist utilitarianism, as the law is
purely for the protection of human interests, rather than animal
interests.84 The law is aimed at protecting the economic interests—and
potentially human safety interests—of businesses and organizations
that maintain animals in their operations, such as teaching hospitals, as
well as the food industry, biomedical industry, and fur industry.85 The
AETA fails to account for the burdens, costs, and externalities (e.g. death,
suffering) placed upon animal subjects. Food handling laws that are
centered around human health and safety also come within the
penumbra of speciesist utilitarianism and are appropriate for analysis
at the coarse level of the filter.86
d. Chattel Theory
Under the views of James Madison, “Government is instituted to
protect property of every sort; as well that which lies in the various
rights of individuals, as that which the term particularly expresses. This
being the end of government, that alone is a just government, which
impartially secures to every man whatever is his own.”87
Protection of animals as chattels only occurs when human
ownership and human safety interests coincide with animal
protection.88 One difficulty in addressing humane treatment of animals
can be attributed to the concept of ownership.89 Ownership “implies
83 See generally Evans supra note 62, at 177-180 (discussing how a utilitarian could
posit that humans must ascribe feelings and values, and therefore human utility, to all
species in order for the utilitarian equation to function towards animal protection).
84 18 U.S.C. §43 (2020).
85 Berger, supra note 30, at 301-302.
86 See text and accompanying notes at 61-63, supra.
87 Nick Dranias, The Local Liberty Charter: Restoring Grassroots Liberty to Restrain
Cities Gone Wild, 3 PHOENIX L. REV. 113, 158-59 (2010) (quoting James Madison, Property,
reprinted in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 515 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999)).
88 Satz, supra note 16, at 67.
89 See Garner, supra note 43, at 78-79 (“In the first place, not all animals are regarded
as the property of private citizens, yet this has not prevented them from being
mercilessly exploited. Wild animals, for example, fall into this category. While there are
various ways in which ownership of wild animals can and has been conferred, without
this confirmation, animals in the wild are not owned by private citizens. Despite this
fact, wild animals are not regarded as possessors of rights. Conversely, it should be
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entitlements to the owner” and consequently carries an implication that
the owner may have the right to do as he or she pleases with the
animal.90
If the chattel property status of animals were eliminated, this
would beg the question of whether the legal status of “personhood” is—
or should be—concomitantly conferred to animals. Indeed, if animals
receive legal “person” status, it would be difficult to continue the
practice of raising animals for slaughter and consumption, unless we
conterminously adapt a standard of cannibalism as acceptable.
It is a strange state of affairs that corporations carry the rights of
personhood,91 despite not being sentient living beings. How can we call
the paper fiction of a corporation a “person,” while simultaneously
allowing living creatures mere property status as non-persons? Chattel
theory directs us to the simple explanation that humans are ultimately
more concerned with property and ownership rights than the legal
status of other living creatures.
e. Coarse Filtration Applied To The California Foie Gras
Law
The coarse level of the filter is appropriate for reviewing legislation
impacting animals only where the animal protection component is a
secondary result of human-centric legislation. The California foie gras
law is focused on the treatment of the food animals during their lifetime,
92 rather than on food safety or other human safety. The purpose of this
noted that there are cases where domestication, and therefore ownership, has had
positive implications for wild animals. For instance, although contentious, it might be
suggested that animal species with little or no chance of surviving in the wild, that are
kept in zoos with very good records of environmental enrichment, benefit from human
ownership.”); David Favre, Living Property: A New Status For Animals Within The Legal
System, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1021, 1044 (Spring 2010) (“Wild beings within natural
ecosystems are not personal property. While governments assert the right to control
access to wild animals, they do not have possessory rights or ownership of wild
animals. The state does not possess these animals, and has little control over them and
little responsibility for their well-being, at least at the present. While wild animals have
many of the same sorts of interests as domestic animals and therefore a basis for legal
rights, the legal context for acknowledging them will require a different analysis than is
provided in this Article. For example, the concepts of living space and duty of care have
to be different when the animals are not possessed by humans.”).
90 Garner, supra note 43, at 81-84.
91 See generally Konstantin Tretyakov, Corporate Identity and Group Dignity, 8 WASH.
U. JURIS. REV. 171 (2016); Nick J. Sciullo, Reassessing Corporate Personhood in the Wake of
Occupy Wall Street, 22 WIEDENER L. J. 611 (2013); Stuart Kirsch, Imagining Corporate
Personhood, 37 POLAR: POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 207 (Nov. 2014).
92 See generally Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et
d’Oies du Québec v. Becerra, (No. 17-1285), 2018 WL 1315086, at*22 (March 9, 2018)
(“As Justice Sotomayor more recently put it, ‘The primary purpose of a food of any kind
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law is not for human protection and, thus, it must pass through and
beyond the coarse level of filtration for proper evaluation and analysis.
Indeed, theories at the coarse level actually would oppose and nullify
this law, because it does not pertain to human protection. In this
respect, the filter is useful in eschewing erroneous and misleading
analysis of the underlying legislation.
2.

MEDIUM FILTRATION

The medium level of filtration is best suited to analyze legislation
that is designed to address some specific component of animal
protection but countered with some underlying carve-out reflecting
human self-interests that have been reserved. This level of filtration
contains legislation based upon the whim of collective societal ethics
implemented through legislation and regulation. Samples of relevant
theories at this level of filtration include: Deontology, Bentham, and
Singer Utilitarianism.
a. Deontology (Kant):
Immanuel Kant recognized that humans have an obligation in their
treatment of animals.93
Deontological or rights-based views are derived from the
tradition of Immanuel Kant . . . who believed that rights are
possessed by, and duties are owed to, beings capable of
mutual justification and reason-giving. While nonhuman
animals do not possess these capacities and therefore cannot
themselves be rights-holders, Kant believed that humans have
indirect duties to animals. Cruelty to animals, Kant argues,
offends humanity: “A master who turns out his ass or his dog
because the animal can no longer earn its keep manifests a
small mind.” Under Kant’s view, it is likely that the cruelties
of factory farming and animal experimentation would offend
our humanity, though meat consumption could be justified if
the raising and slaughtering of animals was performed
humanely.94
Applying this theory to the California foie gras law reveals that the
law inadequately fulfils human duties to animals because the law bans
inhumane force-feeding practices but continues to allow the slaughter
of animals for foie gras (and other purposes).
is to be eaten.’ Tr. of Arg. in No. 16-111, at 15:24-25.”); Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et
d’Oies du Québec v. Becerra, 870 F.3d 1140, 1149 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied 139 S.Ct.
862 (2019).
93 See Satz, supra note 16, at 77.
94 Satz, supra note 16, at 77.
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b. Bentham And Singer Utilitarianism
Allowing the pain and pleasure of other species to influence
determinations of animal treatment can provide for some level of
animal protection.
[T]he subjectivity inherent in the utilitarianism allowed
Jeremy Bentham to argue for animal anticruelty laws.
“Benthamites play the game of deriving public policy from the
greatest-happiness principle without rules, and the set of
public policies he proposed resembles nothing so much as his
personal preferences (he was notoriously fond of animals,
especially cats).”95
Animal rights commentator Peter Singer also challenges speciesist
utilitarianism, and views animals as having the same ability to
experience pain and other sensations as sentient beings.96 “Under
Singer’s view, the suffering (or happiness) of nonhuman sentient
animals should be given equal consideration to the suffering (or
happiness) of human animals.”97 Using a utilitarian equation to register
the pain of animals requires that humans not be speciesist bullies and
that humans instead engage in assiduous analysis of animal pain,
suffering, rights, and interests. Unfortunately, “the law measures
nonhuman animals with a human yardstick.”98
The resultant
subjectivity of utilitarianism makes it difficult to harness and
consistently apply meaningful parameters.99 As Judge Posner has
commented, this approach to animal rights is only functional when
rational human actors are prepared to “value nonhuman animal
interests to provide for those protections.”100
Under Singer’s utilitarian analysis,
[t]he suffering of animals in factory farms, laboratories, the
entertainment industry, and households must be weighed
against human satisfaction derived from the use of animals in
95

Evans, supra note 62, at 177-78.
See generally PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION (2d. ed. 1990); Satz, supra note 16,
at 75-76.
97 Satz, supra note 16, at 76.
98 Evans, supra note 62, at 181.
99 Evans, supra note 62, at 178 (“[W]hether they are included is entirely
subjective.”).
100 Evans, supra note 62, at 180; see also Goodman, supra note 57, at 1302 (“Posner’s
alternative to rights or strictly utilitarian approaches is a ‘soft utilitarian’ commitment
to take seriously the suffering of animals. Empathy, not moral duty, requires this
commitment. Animal suffering matters because it debases humanity and causes (or
should cause) human suffering. The sly importation of a prescriptive element here
nearly unravels Posner’s humanist theory, since what humans should feel is a question
of ethics—what they owe to animals-not empathy.”).
96
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these contexts. For example, human pleasure in consuming a
ham sandwich cannot outweigh the profound suffering of a
pig. . . . To argue otherwise, Singer suggests, would be
speciesist.101
Under Singer’s approach, humans may make the decision that their
lives have more value than animal life.102 In the review of this concept
by Professor Ani Satz, she begs the question as to whether the sacrifice
of “100 million mice to find a cure for a common cancer that affects 2.5
million people” can be justified.103 Applying Singer’s theory, the
ultimate conclusion depends on the details of each specific situation and
a balancing of the interests à la non-speciesist utilitarianism, albeit
determined by humans.104
Applying this type of utilitarianism, if a choice had to be made
between saving an innocent rabbit105 or a convicted child molester
human, the rabbit should be the clear winner. This choice contradicts
speciesist utilitarianism, where the human would be saved. Delving
further into the discussion on the point raised by Professor Satz, many
humans have no difficulty in killing “home invasion” mice in order to
prevent prospective damage to homes and contamination through
disease.106 When the discussion turns to breeding laboratory mice for
the purpose of experimentation, however, an entirely different set of
questions arises. This raises the not so rhetorical question of how many
“innocent” mouse lives equate to the value of a human life? What if we
account for the character and value of each specific mouse sacrificed and
each specific human benefited? Why sacrifice a kind, even-tempered,
well groomed, healthy mouse to save the life of a despicable and violent
human? Again, this level of inquiry is not intended to suggest that it is
an easy task to commence moral inquiry into the lives of animals (doing
so with humans is perplexing enough), but rather is intended to
exemplify the challenge in balancing human versus animal interests at
the medium stage of the filter.
c. Medium Filtration Applied To The California Foie

101

Satz, supra note 16, at 76.
Satz, supra note 16, at 76-77.
103 Satz, supra note 16, at 77.
104 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
105 I am unaware of, and my research has not revealed, any guilty rabbits.
106 See generally CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Trap Up! Trap Rodents
Around
the
Home
to
Help
Reduce
the
Rodent
Population,
https://www.cdc.gov/rodents/prevent_infestations/trap_up.html
(last
visited
December 18, 2020).
102
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Gras Law
The medium level of filtration exposes the trade-off between
human desires and some aspect of animal protection. The California foie
gras legislation is designed to make humans feel virtuous by restricting
force-feeding practices. Within this context, the legislation contains vast
gerrymandering of rights and interests. Though the California law
addresses treatment of birds.107 The law continues to allow for the
slaughter and sale of these birds;108 it allows for the sale of foie gras
raised through non-force-feeding methods;109 and it fails to address any
other aspect of the treatment of these animals.110
Embodied in the California foie gras legislation is an underlying
legislative and utilitarian compromise: foie gras is an extravagant
gourmet delicacy, and the pain/suffering of the force fed animal exceeds
the benefit to those who consume such force-fed foie gras.111 The law
does not prohibit sale of non-force fed foie gras, or any other types of
bird meat (excluding foie gras product) potentially raised through forcefeeding or other adverse conditions.112 At the medium stage of filtration,
it becomes apparent that the California foie gras law is highly specific
and delimited in scope. I interpret the focus on protection of force-fed
birds as akin to a legislative moral carbon offset in the realm of animal
protection; one particular type of animal is protected under a limited set
of circumstances.113
3.

Fine Filtration

The fine level of filtration moves away from utilitarian ascription
of costs and benefits, and instead focuses upon the issue of vulnerability.
Professor Ani Satz’s vulnerable subject theory provides an appropriate
method for analyzing legislation/regulation at the fine level of
filtration.114 Review at this level moves past utilitarian analysis of

107

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25980(a) (2020).
Id. at §§ 25980-25984.
109 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25981 (2020) (“A person may not force-feed a bird for
the purpose of enlarging the bird’s liver beyond normal size, or hire another person to
do so.”).
110 Id. at §§ 25980-25984.
111 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §25982 (2020) (“A product may not be sold in California
if it is the result of force-feeding a bird for the purpose of enlarging the bird’s liver
beyond normal size.”).
112 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25980-25984 (2020). See infra notes 121, 123-125,
and accompanying text.
113 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25980-25984 (2020).
114 Satz, supra note 16, at 78-80.
108
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human benefit versus animal cost, and instead focuses upon a
situational analysis of the subject animal.
a. Vulnerability Theory (Satz):
In explaining her vulnerability theory, Satz notes that
animals are part of our moral community because they are a
constitutive part of our environment and contribute to its
diversity. Thus, animals within our ecosystem are vulnerable
to disturbances and possess claims to noninterference
regardless of sentience, or the ability to suffer. This view is
the most inclusive approach to the moral status of animals
because it creates a presumption against harm to all animals
regardless of mental properties.115
Satz further notes that “[t]he permanent dependency of domestic
animals is created and controlled by humans, rendering them uniquely
vulnerable to exploitation.”116 Humans are therefore ethically obligated
to consider the health, safety, and welfare of nonhuman animals, as such
creatures are vulnerable to the imposition of our destructive human
will.
Vulnerability theory forces us to expand the level of inquiry
without halting at the customary utilitarian cost-benefit border. Satz
has referenced the application of Martha Fineman’s concepts on the
topic, where vulnerability is “the possibility of becoming dependent.”117
This means that the “vulnerable subject may have episodic or
permanent dependency on others.”118
First, animal capacities for suffering are morally relevant, as
are higher-order capacities, such as the ability to see oneself
existing over time. Second, it is speciesist to privilege human
over nonhuman animal suffering. Speciesism gives rise to
legal gerrymandering, undermining animal protections and
creating legal inconsistencies. Third, human and nonhuman
animals are universally vulnerable to suffering, and their most
basic capabilities must be treated equally before nonhuman
animals may be used to support higher-order human
capabilities. State institutions must not privilege humans in
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Satz, supra note 16, at 78.
Satz, supra note 16, at 80. (This theory notes that the dependence of non-human
domestic animals is permanent. Throughout their lives, domestic animals rely on
humans to provide them nourishment, shelter, and other care.).
117 Satz, supra note 16, at 79.
118 Satz, supra note 16, at 79.
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responding to universal vulnerability affecting certain basic
capabilities.119
Exercising artistic license and taking the liberty of applying Satz’s
vulnerability theory, I offer some examples of how vulnerability theory
can be useful in allowing granular level (hence, the fine filter stage)
review of situational circumstances.
Let us assume that a lioness escapes from a zoo and roams a
neighborhood full of humans. The lioness might not initially appear to
be vulnerable. She is a powerful carnivore, capable of capturing and
eating any human. Actions taken to stop the lioness, including terminal
measures, might seem in order.
Deeper examination within
vulnerability theory, however, reveals that it is humans who placed the
lioness in the zoo, and humans who failed to provide appropriate
containment and allowed the lioness to escape. Humans being stalked
by the escaped lioness are only at risk because other humans, those
responsible for the care of the lioness, were negligent and created this
risk. Does this mean that the lioness should be allowed to consume
humans in the neighborhood?
Not necessarily; however, the
vulnerability analysis helps us to engage in this granular, fine level
review.
As a second example, let us assume that a mountain lion is stalking
a hiker on a trail as part of a delicious meal plan. Should the hiker have
the right to kill the mountain lion? The hiker initially appears to be more
vulnerable and at-risk. But what if the trail is part of a vast human
encroachment upon the native habitat of this animal, and the
construction of homes/parks/etc. has barricaded the mountain lion into
a tiny, isolated space? The mountain lion may now appear to be
vulnerable if penalized for stalking the human.
As a third example, assume that there is a healthy duck that has
flown into a pond in a public park. This duck is vulnerable, with many
natural predators, including humans. A law protecting such ducks
would seem in order under these circumstances. If, however, the same
duck is harboring a disease that adversely affects other animals (or
humans), then this duck’s diseased status could render others
vulnerable, and at-risk.
These examples demonstrate that vulnerability theory provides an
additional angle of analysis. Vulnerability analysis brings new light
through old windows, by moving the inquiry away from customary
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utilitarian cost-benefit analysis, and evaluating animals within the same
moral community as humans.120
b. Fine Filtration Applied To The California Foie Gras
Law
When the vulnerability analysis is applied to the California’s foie
gras law it illuminates that the law only applies to sales within
California, and that the law continues to allow sale of foie gras produced
through methods other than force-feeding. The fine level of filtration
further reveals the selectivity of the law in that it allows the same
animals to be raised—and even force-fed—for meat sales (excluding
foie gras).121 Concomitantly, the fact that there is no human “need” to
consume foie gras is also illuminated at this level.122 Moreover, the fine
level of filtration exposes the fact that the California foie gras law only
partially addresses its purported purpose of protecting animal welfare,
as the vulnerable subjects (namely birds),123 if force-fed, may be sold as
long as the liver is not sold,124 and birds which are not force-fed are
devoid of any such sales restrictions.125
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Satz, supra note 16, at 78.
See Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 944
(9th Cir. 2013). (“Plaintiffs contend that the district court correctly concluded that §
25982 prohibits the sale of all products from force-fed birds including duck breasts and
down jackets. The State argues that § 25982 covers only products that are the result of
force-feeding a bird to enlarge its liver beyond normal size, i.e., products made from an
enlarged duck liver. We agree with the State’s interpretation.”).
122 See Sullivan and Wolfson, supra note 4, at 153 (“Of course, it is possible to
distinguish between different foods produced from different animals according to how
essential they are, and to argue that a culinary delicacy like foie gras does not deserve
the same measure of consideration as other, more basic, foods. And yet, was we have
said, making this distinction might open the door to the most microscopic distinctions.
It seems obvious that Justice Grunis is correct, in that no animal-based food is actually
necessary for human existence, at least in a society where numerous plant-based
‘substitute’ foods are available.”).
123 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25980(a) (2020) (“A bird includes, but is not limited
to, a duck or goose.”).
124 See Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d Oies du Quebec, 729 F.3d at 944.
125 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §25982 (2020) (“A product may not be sold in California
if it is the result of force-feeding a bird for the purpose of enlarging the bird’s liver
beyond normal size.”) Although California does have a criminal law prohibiting
enumerated types of animal cruelty, but obviously force-feeding of birds does not fall
within the scope of this law or else those producing foie gras in California would have
been subjected to criminal prosecution, and the legislature would not have deemed it
necessary to enact the foie gras law. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 597 (2020).
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IV. CONCLUSION
My proposed filter-based analysis model is designed to provide an
additional tool in analyzing animal protection legislation. It is neither
intended to be a stand-alone analytic tool, nor to supplant the panoply
of other methods and theories available to us in addressing animal
protection. The underlying goal is to improve discussions and foster
productive debate.
The filter can help to sort through a wide range of animal
protection legislation by addressing human-centric laws (coarse filter),
combined human and animal interests measured through human utility
(medium filter), or legislation centered on vulnerability, dependence,
and “at-risk” conditions (fine filter). This process is intended to aid in
revealing strengths and weaknesses, including areas for improvement,
in animal protection legislation.
Animals do not have a jury of peers determining their rights and
protections. The way we treat and protect other animal beings is a
massive reflection on who and what we are as humans. Such reflection
must, a priori, extend to the humane care and treatment of animals,
including the circumstances surrounding their life and death. By
treating animals responsibly and properly, we become better humans.

